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Leakage Is Prohibited: Memory Protection Extensions Protected
Address Space Randomization
Fei Yan and Kai Wang
Abstract: Code reuse attacks pose a severe threat to modern applications. These attacks reuse existing code
segments of vulnerable applications as attack payloads and hijack the control flow of a victim application. With
high code entropy and a relatively low performance overhead, Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) has
become the most widely explored defense against code reuse attacks. However, a single memory disclosure
vulnerability is able to compromise this defense. In this paper, we present Memory Protection Extensions (MPX)assisted Address Space Layout Randomization (M-ASLR), a novel code-space randomization scheme. M-ASLR
uses several characteristics of Intel MPX to restrict code pointers in memory. We have developed a fully functioning
prototype of M-ALSR, and our evaluation results show that M-ASLR: (1) offers no interference with normal
operation; (2) protects against buffer overflow attacks, code reuse attacks, and other sophisticated modern attacks;
and (3) adds a very low performance overhead (3.3%) to C/C++ applications.
Key words: Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR); Intel Memory Protection Extensions (MPX); code reuse
attack

1

Introduction

Code injection has always presented a major threat
to software, but with the wide deployment of DEP[1]
and W ˚ X, classic code injection attacks are no
longer feasible. In response, attackers are now forced
to seek out and utilize code segments of the target
application to construct the attack payload. From the
reuse of sensitive system functions in related libraries
of the target application (e.g., return-into-libc[2] ) to
chaining code segments into attack payloads (e.g.,
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)[3, 4] ), code reuse
has become a state-of-the-art attack pattern in modern
applications. Such attacks grant to the adversary
arbitrary execution privileges without requiring the
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injection of any malicious code. Consequently, code
reuse attacks have made preventing the hijacking
of control flow a vital pursuit for software security
practitioners[5] .
Because it is easy to deploy and efficient to run,
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)[6] has
become the most widely explored mechanism for
defending against code reuse in modern operating
systems[7, 8] . However, the entropy brought by ASLR
can be compromised through a single memory
disclosure[9–11] . With the help of leaked information, the
locations of sensitive components after randomization
can be exposed to attackers. Even in cases of finergrained randomization, the offset within a module
remains unchanged. The adversary is able to exploit the
same vulnerability repeatedly until finally locating all
of the components necessary to launch a sophisticated
attack[9, 12] .
One way of enhancing the security of ASLR is
to prevent code pointers from leakage. Lu et al.[13]
promoted ASLR-Guard, which provides a safe memory
region named the AG-Stack for the storage of code
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pointers, and encrypts those code pointers before
performing operations on data elements. However, the
complexity of program architectures and the challenges
presented by low-level programming languages make it
difficult to separate code. Furthermore, modern exploits
such as Just-In-Time ROP (JIT-ROP) code reuse[12] can
engage in malicious behaviors by probing the memory
area and redirecting the code pointer, in which case
code pointers are encrypted in vain. Consequently,
protecting code pointers in applications is a necessary
but also challenging task.
Starting with the Skylake CPU, Intel has provided
secure Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) to
eliminate memory disclosure vulnerabilities[14, 15] . In
contrast to other vulnerability mitigation approaches,
MPX guarantees the legality of code pointers through
a new CPU architecture and instruction set. The
introduced CPU architecture grants to the hardware the
ability to check the validity of code pointers. With the
help of MPX instructions, C/C++ compilers can check
the lower and upper bounds of a code pointer before it
is referenced; the elimination of buffer overflows is now
a real possibility.
Bound Registers (BR): Intel MPX provides four
new specialized 128-bit bound registers for temporarily
holding the bounds of a code pointer and performing
bounds operations. Those bound registers can only
be modified via privileged instructions. As shown in
Fig. 1, the lower 64 bits of the register hold the
lower bound of the code pointer, and the upper 64
bits hold the upper bound. The specialized design
and strict CPU-maintained access control mechanisms
give assurances of integrity and confidentiality when
processing bounds. In contrast to the segment registers
used by Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI) for the same
functionality, the bound registers in MPX prevent the
unintended modification of the value of the registers on
the part of the operating system and other applications.
Bound Table: To achieve the confidentiality and
integrity of computed pointer bounds, Intel MPX
provides a specialized data structure called a Bound
Table in an isolated memory space. As shown in
Fig. 2, the MPX Bound Table stores the computed
pointer bounds with the pointer value and metadata. The
privileged instruction pair BNDSTX and BNDLDX is
127
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Bound Table provided by Intel MPX.

designed to store and read bounds from the Bound
Table.
Exception Handling: In default scenarios, code
pointers stay within their ranges. However, code
pointers can point out of range under some unexpected
situations, such as an execution error or buffer overflow
attack. Intel MPX provides the exception handler #BR
for such conditions. The #BR exception is hardware
generated and can be caught and processed by exception
handling scripts provided by software developers. This
exception can be raised by a bounds comparison
fault or an unexpected read or write to the Bound
Table. The exception handling mechanism ensures the
completeness of bounds checking and maintenance.
Although MPX is an effective extension to the
legality of code pointers, discovering all of the code
pointers in the source code is not an easy task[16] . In
this paper, with the aim to efficiently protect the legality
and integrity of code pointers, we propose MPXassisted Address Space Layout Randomization (MASLR), a novel code-space randomization scheme. MASLR leverages several characteristics of MPX, such as
bound checking and the Bound Table, to help prevent
memory leakages from the beginning. The main idea
of M-ASLR is to bound code pointers while looking up
the mapping table. M-ASLR is conceptually simple,
but it does require considerable effort to distinguish
code pointers from data segments and set their bounds
appropriately. M-ASLR is practical and light-weight.
In contrast to other work on enhancing the security
of ASLR[13, 17–21] , M-ASLR introduces no extra data
structures in memory, and support for bound checking
of a code pointer is provided by the CPU. This
feature increases M-ASLR’s versatility and ease of
deployment. We have developed a fully functioning
prototype of M-ASLR, and used it to evaluate the
performance characteristics and security features of our
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scheme. The results show that M-ASLR: (1) offers
no interference with normal operations; (2) protects
against buffer overflow attacks, code reuse attacks,
and other sophisticated modern attacks; and (3) adds
a very low performance overhead (3.3%) to C/C++
applications.
In summary, our main contributions in this paper are:
 We propose M-ASLR, a novel code-space
randomization scheme for enhancing the ASLR
security feature.
 We introduce a new code pointer discovery
strategy for MPX protection.
 We perform a systematic analysis of sophisticated
code reuse attack patterns on M-ASLR, and
demonstrate that M-ASLR is able to eliminate
buffer overflow vulnerabilities and further resist such
code reuse attacks.
 We implement a prototype of M-ASLR, with our
evaluation showing that M-ASLR is a practical solution
with a low performance overhead.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows.
In Section 2, we detail our threat model and
assumptions. The basic ideas behind M-ASLR and its
implementation are illustrated in Section 3. We then
evaluate the effectiveness and performance overhead of
the proposed scheme in Section 4. In Section 5, we
discuss the security features of M-ASLR. Section 6
reviews existing ASLR-related literature. Finally, we
conclude our paper and provide a brief outlook for our
work in Section 7.

2

Threat Model and Assumptions

To ensure that our scheme is practical, we define
our threat model based on strong yet realistic
assumptions. We assume the adversary has ready
access to the technologies needed to launch a code
reuse attack. Drawing on attack models used for related
schemes[7, 13, 17–20] , and the attack patterns illustrated in
related studies[2–4, 9, 12] , we generate our threat model
and make assumptions as follows.
The adversary aims to hijack the control flow

of a target application by launching a code reuse
attack. We assume the target application has one or
more vulnerabilities that can grant an adversary the
privilege to read from and write to an arbitrary memory
address; and that these vulnerabilities can be exploited
repeatedly without causing a crash, such that the
adversary is allowed to exploit the vulnerability at will.
We further assume that the adversary has open access
to the target application and is able to perform reverse
computation on the executable file to locate useful code
segments and function entries.
We assume the target platform is running a widely
available operating system with standard defense
mechanisms, such as W ˚ X and ASLR, enabled
by default. In M-ASLR, the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) is the CPU, and there are a few
known side-channel exploits on CPU caches, such
as Meltdown[22] and Spectre attacks[23] . By exploiting
these vulnerabilities, CPU cache information can be
dumped, and such information leakage through the
platform itself would corrupt the TCB of our scheme.
We therefore assume that these CPU information
leakage vulnerabilities are well patched.

3

Proposed M-ASLR Scheme

M-ASLR enhances the security programs by bounding
the validity range of code pointers. By performing
source code instrumentation, MPX source code
insertion and bounds narrowing, M-ASLR modifies the
source program into an MPX program. Figure 3 shows
an overview of our M-ASLR scheme. The compiler is
responsible for code pointer discovery, after which the
compiler inserts MPX code to the binary and narrows
the validity bounds of each discovered code pointer.
The modified code is then compiled into an executable
file. The bounds of each pointer are stored in the Bound
Table in an isolated memory space, meaning that the
table is transparent to applications in userspace. At
runtime, M-ASLR uses the features of Intel MPX to
check the validity of each code pointer. When a code
pointer attempts to access an address beyond its legal
Memory layout
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limits, M-ASLR throws an exception and redirects the
request to a valid memory location.
To implement our M-ASLR scheme, we present
three key phases: code pointer discovery, MPX code
insertion, and bound narrowing. The code pointer
discovery phase is responsible for locating and
extracting all code pointers. In the MPX code insertion
phase, the compiler inserts MPX code into the binary.
The inserted MPX code is responsible for computing
the lower and upper bounds of each code pointer and
providing means for checking the legality of code
pointers. The bound narrowing phase analyzes the data
structure and narrows the bounds to the minimum.
3.1

Code pointer discovery

As we mentioned, the key idea of M-ASLR is to bound
the legal range of code pointers. The discovery of code
pointers stands as the highest priority requirement of
our scheme. However, previous research on enhancing
the security feature of ASLR has paid less attention to
the discovery of code pointers. The work of Lu et al.[13]
presented the first study on the discovery of pointers or
data that can leak the memory layout of code space.
To counter the threats described in Section 2, and to
support the realization of M-ASLR, we propose an
analysis to discover such code pointers in a program.
Compared to Ref. [13], our discovery method differs in
application scenario and implementation.
Application scenario: The work of Lu et al.[13]
on protecting the integrity of code space relies on
encryption. The mapping of code space is crucial under
these circumstances, so Lu et al.[13] extracted code
pointers and related elements that can be used to infer
the mapping of code space. In contrast, in M-ASLR,
the range of a code pointer is strictly bounded, and the
layout of code space is no longer crucial. In M-ASLR,
we focus only on code pointers, not on related code or
data elements.
Implementation: The work of Lu et al.[13] extracts
code pointers from a binary, and places those pointers
in an isolated memory space. In contrast, M-ASLR
uses the Bound Table provided by MPX, the integrity of
which is guaranteed by the CPU. This provides strong
integrity assurance and avoids the need to design an
additional data structure in memory.
Similar to the work of Lu et al.[13] , we categorize
the code pointers based on the execution status of
the target application. Following this schema, code
pointers can be divided into two main types: load-
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time code pointers and dynamic code pointers. Loadtime code pointers are those that are generated as the
program is loaded into the memory, such as Procedure
Linkage Table (PLT) entry and virtual function pointers.
Dynamic code pointers are those that are generated
during runtime, such as return pointers; the values
of this latter category of pointer change dynamically.
According to different characteristics in the lifecycle
of these two types of code pointers, M-ASLR extracts
them separately.
Load-time code pointers: When the operating
system loads the target application, the kernel allocates
memory for it and loads the Executable and Linkable
Format (ELF) file together with the dynamic linker.
During this procedure, all code pointers are loaded into
memory. Based on this observation, we modify the
relocation functions in the dynamic linker to make it
so all code pointers are processed by the relocation
function. This ensures that all load-time pointers are
extracted.
Runtime code pointers: Unlike load-time code
pointers, runtime code pointers are generated
dynamically and the value of the pointer changes
during execution. Runtime code pointers are generated
by control flow transfer instructions, such as call and
ret. In order to extract all runtime code pointers, we
leverage LLVM to instrument the source code. The
instrumentation procedure helps us to identify control
flow transfers in the target application and ensures that
we discover all runtime code pointers.
3.2

MPX code insertion

After discovering all code pointers in source code, MASLR inserts MPX code into the source code. The
inserted MPX code is responsible for computing the
bounds of each code pointer and adding related bounds
checking instructions.
3.2.1

Bound computing

The key idea of M-ASLR is bounding the legal range of
each code pointer and thus eliminating potential buffer
overflow vulnerabilities. This makes bounds computing
an important node in the whole scheme. During a
bounds computing procedure, the compiler iterates
through the source code and performs an analysis of the
data flow. For each discovered code pointer, M-ASLR
adopts one of five different bounds computing strategies
according to the source of the code pointer. We divide
the pointer source into five main types, as listed in
Table 1.
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Table 1
Pointer source type
Function call pointer
Load pointer
Argument pointer
Object address pointer
Field address pointer

Types of pointer source.

Description
Pointer used to invoke a function call
Pointer which is loaded from the memory
Pointer used as a function argument
Pointer points to the address of an object
Pointer points to the address of a certain field of an object

M-ASLR applies different bounds computing
strategies for each of these five types of pointer source.
For a function call pointer, the bounds are consistent
with the pre-allocated memory buffer of the invoked
function. Similarly, the bounds of the corresponding
data structure are read from the Bound Table and
passed to a load pointer. An argument pointer serves
as an argument to a function. Under this circumstance,
M-ASLR assumes that the arguments to the function
are in effect for the range of the whole function.
Consequently, the bounds of an argument pointer
are determined by the caller function, and the lower
and upper bounds of the function are passed to the
argument pointer. For an object pointer, the compiler
leverages the address of the object as the lower bound
of the pointer; the upper bound is then calculated
according the size of the object. M-ASLR adopts a
size-computation policy equal to C/C++ standards.
For example, the size of a specific data structure is
calculated according to its first variable. Note that the
bounds of a field address pointer should be carefully
processed. In this case, the pointer only points to a
specific element in a field. In the bound computing
phase, M-ASLR treats a field address pointer in the
same way as an object pointer, and hands the bounds
narrowing procedure to the bound narrowing phase.
The bounds that have thereby been determined are
saved in the Bound Table.
3.2.2

Bound checking

Once the valid bounds of each code pointer have been
determined, they are saved into the Bound Table. In
the bound checking procedure, M-ASLR inserts bounds
checking and exception handling instructions into the
source code. The specific algorithm for inserting bounds
checking instructions is given as Algorithm 1. M-ASLR
iterates the source code and inserts the bounds checking
instructions (BNDCL and BNDCU) to check the lower
and upper bounds before the pointer value is used.
After the bounds checking instructions are inserted, MASLR adds an exception handling function to the end

Example
char *p = getchar()
int *p = int [m]
int func (int *p)
struct A *p = & sample
char *p = & sample ! fld

Algorithm 1 Bound checking instructions insertion
Input:
(1) List of code pointers, PList;
(2) Exception handling function, Efunc.
Output:
Code with bound checking instructions inserted, BCode.
1: for p 2 PList do
2:
insertBefore (p, BNDCL);
3:
insertBefore (p, BNDCU);
4:
insertBefore (p, throwBRexception);
5: end for
6: i
the end instruction of code;
7: insertAfter(i , catchBRexception);
8: insertAfter(i , Efunc);
9: return BCode.

of the source code. The exception handling function is
designed to catch any #BR exception raised by a bound
violation and redirect the violating pointer to a random
valid address.
3.2.3

Bound narrowing

The bound computing phase determines the bounds
of most code pointers. However, as we have already
noted, a field address pointer only points to a specific
component in a data structure. This means that it has
its own circumscribed bounds different from the bounds
of the field data structure. In the bound computing
phase, the compiler leaves the bounds of field address
pointers unchanged, and hands the issue over to the
bound narrowing phase.
The bound narrowing phase is responsible for
narrowing the bounds of field address pointers to the
minimum. To constrain the bounds of a field pointer,
M-ASLR applies the following principles:
 For a static data structure, the bounds of the field
address pointer are consistent with the outermost data
structure;
 For a dynamic data structure, or for a data structure
with uncertain properties, the bounds of the field
address pointer are consistent with the innermost data
structure.
The bound narrowing process for field code pointers
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follows Algorithm 2.
For example, as shown in Fig. 4, the sizes of
structures Data1, Data2, and Data3 are 8, 48, and
296, respectively. Before bounds narrowing, the bound
computing phase leaves the bounds of the three code
pointers as [&data, &data+295]. During the bounds
narrowing phase, M-ASLR makes an elaborate bounds
computation according to the above two principles.
For static data structures, such as the first two data
pointers in our example, M-ASLR treats the outermost
data structure Data1 as the bounds of the field code
pointer. Whereas for a dynamic data structure, such as
the final code pointer in Fig. 4, M-ASLR treats the
innermost data structure Data2 d32[5] as the bounds
of the field code pointer. After bounds narrowing, MASLR invokes BNDMK to update the corresponding
bounds in the Bound Table.
Algorithm 2 Bound narrowing for field code pointer
Input:
(1) List of discovered field code pointers, FList;
(2) List of static data structure, SList;
(3) List of dynamic data structure, DList;
(4) Bound Table, BT.
Output:
Updated bound table, UBT.
1: for field code pointer f 2 FList do
2:
if f 2 SList then
3:
f:bounds = f:Outermostbounds;
4:
BNDMK(f , f:bounds, BT);
5:
else if f 2 DList then
6:
f:bounds = f:Innermostbounds;
7:
BNDMK(f , f:bounds, BT);
8:
else
9:
f:bounds = f:Innermostbounds;
10:
BNDMK(f , f:bounds, BT);
11:
end if
12: end for
13: return UBT.

4
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Evaluation

We perform a performance evaluation on a 64-bit 16.04
Ubuntu machine. The machine is equipped with an
Intel i5-6500 CPU and 16 GB memory. The LLVM and
Clang used for our evaluation are both at version 3.5.2.
4.1

Memory cost evaluation

M-ASLR inserts MPX instructions to the input source
code in order to perform bounds checking and to
add exception handling functions to catch bound
comparison violations. Those inserted instructions are
loaded into memory together with the application so,
inevitably, the memory requirements for an M-ASLR
application increase. In our experiment, we use MASLR to compile some frequently-used libraries so as
to evaluate the memory space cost of M-ASLR, with the
evaluation results shown in Fig. 5.
Compared to overall size of the source code,
the inserted MPX bounds checking instructions and
exception handling functions only occupy a small
proportion of space. Our evaluation confirms that these
inserted instructions offer no interference to the normal
execution of applications, and that the average memory
space overhead is only 1.2%.
4.2

Effectiveness

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our scheme,
we implement M-ASLR on a real-world application
with one or more known buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
The results of these tests indicate that M-ASLR can
effectively prevent buffer overflow exploits and can
prevent others, such as ROP attacks.
Proof of concept: In the first test, we use MASLR to protect a small program containing a single
buffer overflow vulnerability. As shown in Fig. 6a, the
target application calls strcpy() to make operations on
strings without checking the validity of the relative
arguments. With M-ASLR applied, the assembly code
1.2
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after compilation is shown in Fig. 6b. M-ASLR
discovers the code pointer and adds the bounds
checking instructions BNDCL and BNDCU before the
pointer is referenced. We then run a script to trigger
the vulnerability 50 times; all of the 50 attempts trigger
a #BR exception which is handled by our inserted
exception handling function.
No-IP DUC: To further our testing, we use M-ASLR
to compile the No-IP Dynamic Update Client (DUC)
(version 2.1.9). This application fails to perform a
boundary check while invoking the function strcpy(),
which gives rise to a buffer overflow vulnerability.
An adversary could exploit this vulnerability and
then modify the control flow. M-ASLR fills in the
vacant check and ensures that the corresponding code
pointer remains in the range of the allocated memory
buffer, thereby preventing the application from being
vulnerable.
M-ASLR bounds the range of code pointers,
mitigates buffer overflow vulnerabilities and prevents
advanced attack patterns, such as the ROP exploit.
Advancing on other ROP-mitigation approaches, CFIbased defense mechanisms, such as CCFIR[24] and binCFI[25] , ensure the legality of control flow. However,
researchers have responded with a new method of
launching an ROP attack, thus compromising CFI[26] .
On the other hand, M-ASLR adds bounds checking
before each code pointer is referenced, and this
effectively patches buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
Consequently, the code pointer controlled by an attacker
must remain within a legal range, which mitigates ROP
attacks as well as other control flow hijacking attacks,
such as return-to-libc[2] , from the beginning.
4.3
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The realization of M-ASLR relies on instrumenting
the source code of a target application together with
its related libraries. This procedure helps M-ASLR to
analyze the data flow and discover all of the code
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Fig. 6 Functionality verification of M-ASLR: (a) shows the
original assembly code, and (b) shows the assembly code
compiled by M-ASLR.
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pointers. M-ASLR then performs bounds computation
and bounds narrowing on code pointers. We evaluate
the performance overhead of this whole procedure
by adding the time-passes argument. The evaluation
results for some frequently used libraries are shown
in Fig. 7. Generally, the processing time is positively
correlated with the size of the library; the larger the
library is, the longer it takes to process. For example,
for libraries with a size of several hundreds KB,
such as libm-2.23 and libreadline.so.6.3, processing
takes about 48 seconds; in the case of some huge
libraries, such as libc-2.23, it takes about 140 seconds.
However, the number of code pointers is also a factor
in the processing time. For example, the size of library
ld-2.23 is roughly the same as libpthread-2.23 and
liblzma.so.5.0.0, but the former takes more time to
process because of a greater number of code pointers.
As we have already described, M-ASLR adds bounds
checking to the application. The runtime overhead of
M-ASLR mainly comes from reading bounds from
the Bound Table and making code pointer bounds
comparisons. In order to evaluate the overhead of MASLR, we run the benchmark Phoronix Test Suite[27]
with an optimization level of -O2. The evaluation
results are shown in Table 2, where we see that MASLR introduces an average overhead of 3.3%. For
test items with the primary function of processing data
flows, such as encode-ape, encode-flac, and encodemp3, M-ASLR incurs almost no overhead. The highest
level of overhead is 16.55% for the test item apache,
which calls for intense checking on code pointers.
For most test items with a balanced proportion of
code pointer operations, the runtime overhead of
M-ASLR is around 2%. Comparing to other ROP
mitigation approaches, we find that bin-CFI[25] imposes
4.29%, CCFIR[24] 3.6%, KBouncer[28] 4%, and ASLR-

so

mov rdx, rsi;
mov rax, rdi;
call 400470 <strcpy@plt>;

BNDCL BND0, [rdx];
BNDCU BND0, [rdx];
mov rdx, rsi;
mov rax, rdi;
call 400470 <strcpy@plt>;

Processing time (s)
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Fig. 7 Time consumption for processing some frequentlyused libraries.
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Table 2
Test item
sqlite
fs-mark
iozone
openarena
tremulous
urbanterror
hmmer
gmpbench
byte
gcypt
tscp
john-the-ripper
himeno
c-ray
compress-pbzip2
smallpt
compress-lzma
dcraw
encode-ape
encode-flac
encode-mp3
encode-waypack
gnupg
openssl
pgbench
pybench
apache
Average

Runtime overhead of M-ASLR.
Benchmark
78.98
44.87
78.80
30.05
65.73
34.23
48.39
539.26
7 456 897
6362
441 759
1 478 751
370.23
115.30
47.89
621
790.23
182.44
36.69
28.86
41.19
17.98
24.07
36.80
234.63
5751
9925.96

M-ASLR
78.65
43.99
78.41
29.04
61.87
33.53
47.15
524.19
7 456 501
6300
433 940
1 477 934
346.64
113.17
47.07
580
790.08
165.64
36.68
28.84
41.18
17.95
23.58
33.01
229.08
5677
8283.21

Overhead (%)
0.42
1.96
0.49
3.36
5.87
2.04
2.56
2.79
0.01
0.97
1.77
0.06
6.37
1.85
1.71
6.60
1.75
9.21
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
6.19
10.30
2.37
1.29
16.55
3.30

Guard[13] less than 1%. These comparison results show
that the performance overhead of M-ASLR is within an
acceptable range.

5

Discussion

Sophisticated attacks: The key idea of M-ASLR
is to use MPX to bound code pointers and ensure
they remain in the pre-assigned location. Traditional
control flow hijacking attacks, such as return-intolibc[2] and ROP[3, 4] , as well as more sophisticated
attacks[26] , require full control of a single code pointer.
The attacker pre-assembles an attack payload and
modifies the controlled pointer value to the start of the
payload. However, the restriction on the ranges of code
pointer locations provided by M-ASLR obstructs this
prerequisite for an attack by preventing an attacker from
manipulating the value of the code pointer to a memory
address outside of the valid range. As a result, the
attacker loses the capability to transfer the control flow
to the specially chained attack payload. Consequently,
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M-ASLR is able to mitigate sophisticated control flow
hijacking attacks.
Dynamic code generation: Attacks based on
dynamic code generation and Just-in-Time compilation,
such as JIT-ROP[12] , generate an attack payload by
probing the memory during runtime. This feature grants
the adversary the privilege to dump memory and
then bypass ASLR to hijack the control flow of the
target application. The wide usage of the dynamic
compilation technique in web browsers[29] and flash
engines further expands the attack surface. However,
the main idea of M-ASLR is to pre-assign legal bounds
for each code pointer and add runtime validity checks.
Due to the poor runtime boundary checking support
provided by Intel MPX, M-ASLR applies a coarsegrained bounds computation method, by which runtime
code pointers are treated as dynamic data structures
while performing the bounds narrowing procedure. In
accordance with Algorithm 2, the bounds are consistent
with the outermost data structure. This strategy delivers
relatively loose bounds for each runtime code pointer.
Consequently, an adversary can probe the memory
and joint gadgets under MPX restrictions, so attacks
based on exploiting vulnerabilities during dynamic code
generation are still able to seek a vulnerable code
pointer to bypass M-ASLR.
Use-after-free vulnerability: Use-After-Free (UAF)
attacks manipulate code pointers that are not freed on
time (so-called “dangling pointers”) to alter the control
flow of a target application. The checking mechanism
of M-ASLR only guarantees the legal range of a code
pointer before the pointer is referenced. In contrast, as
their name indicates, attacks on the UAF vulnerability
alter the code pointer after it is used, by which point the
validity of the code pointer is no longer checked by MASLR. As a result, our M-ASLR mitigation approach
is not a solution to UAF attacks; these need to be
prevented by the programmer.
Remote control flow hijacking: Remote control
flow hijacking attacks hijack the control flow of a
remote web server via vulnerable web applications or
services. BROP[9] stands as representative of this type
of attack. BROP leverages the fact that the address
space layout of a web server does not re-randomize after
a crash, and exploits the same vulnerability to acquire
enough memory layout information to launch an attack.
The bound checking brought by M-ASLR significantly
increases the robustness of target applications and
renders a crash much less likely. Besides, M-ASLR
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would still bound the code pointer to protect the
integrity of the control flow even if an attacker did
manage to crash a target application. As a result,
M-ASLR is an effective mitigation approach against
remote control flow hijacking attacks.

6
6.1

Related Work
Defense against control-flow hijacking

Since code reuse attacks are a severe threat to modern
software and applications, approaches to defending
against such attacks are proposed regularly. ASLR[6]
is a high-profile representative defense method. Based
on the assumption that it is almost impossible for
an attacker to locate the exact location of sensitive
code information on the first attempt, ASLR reallocates
the address space of the target application when the
program is loaded into memory space. Potential attacks
will then visit an incorrect place in memory and
cause a crash. Being easy to deploy and featuring
a relatively acceptable level of security, ASLR has
been widely explored for use in modern operating
systems. However, the entropy of code space brought
by ASLR can be compromised through a single memory
disclosure vulnerability[9–11] .
In order to enhance security and robustness,
enhancements to ASLR work from two main directions:
finer granularity and runtime re-randomization. ASLR
grants code space at module level, such that the
offset within a module remains unchanged. Aiming to
address this weakness, researchers have put forward
finer-grained randomization approaches. For example,
ASLP[20] randomizes the code space at function level,
Remix[17] at basic block level, and Hiser et al.[19] at
instruction level. However, as granularity increases, the
runtime overhead caused by frequent addressing also
rises. Besides, these enhancements to code entropy are
still fragile in the face of modern attack techniques[12] .
In contrast to these approaches, M-ASLR bounds
the range of code pointers under the restriction of
the CPU and its related architecture. This restriction
overcomes the problem of buffer overflow. The Bound
Table applies strict access control mechanisms, and
there are no known attacks able to compromise it.
Another enhancement to ASLR focuses on runtime
re-randomization. Isomeron[18] keeps a copy of each
function in code space, and randomly chooses the target
for indirection control flow transfers during execution.
However, the adversary is not prevented from launching
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a clone-probing attack, and a noticeable extra memory
allocation is required by this method. RUNTIMEASLR
introduced by Lu et al.[21] preserves the semantic
state of parent processes while forking each child
processes during execution. RUNTIMEASLR shows
its effectiveness against clone-probing attacks such as
BROP, but the scheme requires instrumentation on
source code, which limits its ease of deployment.
In contrast to other ASLR-based defense schemes,
M-ASLR stops memory leakage by leveraging Intel
MPX to protect the integrity and validity of code
pointers. CPI, proposed by Kuznetsov et al.[10] , also
defines a safe region away from the original application,
and records the range of the code pointers, relying on
two special segment registers. Although Kuznetsov et
al.[10] discussed the feasibility of using the two segment
registers, it cannot be guaranteed that the registers
would never be modified by any real-world operating
system or application. On the other hand, the registers
leveraged by M-ASLR are designed by Intel to serve
specifically as bounds registers. From this perspective,
M-ASLR is more straightforward and offers a lower risk
of incompatibility.
6.2

Research on Intel MPX

In 2013, Intel Corporation introduced to developers
a new hardware-assisted memory protection approach
named Intel MPX[30] . However, due to the far more
complex instrumentation on source code required in
order to discover the code pointers[15, 16] , only limited
research has focused on the use of Intel MPX.
Oleksenko et al.[16] gives a systematic analysis on
the features of MPX, pointing out that the specially
designed hardware architecture of Intel MPX provides
a security guarantee of the value of code pointers.
However, discovering the code pointers remains a
tricky problem for developers. In M-ASLR, we use the
dynamic linker to solve this problem, upon noticing
that all code pointers are loaded by the dynamic linker
to give a randomized address allocation while the
application is loaded. With the help of instrumentation,
we are able to discover all code pointers at this stage.

7

Conclusion and Future Work

Intel’s MPX provides a hardware-assisted code pointer
validity check for software and applications, and
features of MPX enhance control flow integrity for
users. However, research on MPX-assisted security
approaches remains limited. In this paper, we present
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an MPX-assisted address space layout randomization
scheme, M-ASLR. Compared to other approaches, MASLR restricts the range of code pointers and thus
eliminates buffer overflow, which is the prerequisite for
a control flow hijacking attack.
We suggest the following extension to our research.
The discussion and evaluation of M-ASLR in this paper
focuses on analyzing the validity of code pointers,
but leaves aside the security of code pointers used
to perform dynamic code generation. However, with
Just-in-Time engines being widely deployed in web
browsers and flash plugins, Just-in-Time compilation
now presents as an important threat vector in modern
systems. We can therefore further improve M-ASLR
by working to support JIT compilation.
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